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[Abstract] Globalisation is shorthand for changes in space, time and the relationship be-
tween them. This paper, which will be forthcoming as a chapter in a book edited by Andrew 
Cooper and published by the United Nations University Press, argues that changes in de-
territorialisation will not have thoroughgoing effects for diplomacy. A change in time, no-
tably the change to zero lag-time in information ﬂows, is, on the other hand, of key impor-
tance. So is the increase in the sheer mass and density of communication. If transcending 
boundaries is the essence of globalisation, then it stands to reason that state diplomats must 
sooner or later take cognizance of the other kinds of polities that exist within the system.
Iver B. Neumann
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In the mid-1970s, when I was a teenager, I asked my godfather, a palaeon-
tologist, whether he thought global warming was a man-made or a natural 
phenomenon. He replied that, however substantive the changes wrought by 
human beings might be, there was no way we could have substantially af-
fected the cycle of global warming that has covered the billions of years over 
which the earth had existed. When I pointed out that the time span that I had 
in mind was the period of less than 20,000 years, during which human socie-
ties had been sedentary, he remarked that such periods were simply too short 
to be of interest to a palaeontologist – and that was the end of our discussion.  
Similarly, what is new about globalisation and what is relevant to diplo-
macy depends on your perspective. I will begin by tracing the phenomenon 
as changes in how space, time and density mould global politics. I will go on 
to argue that globalisation has a forerunner in internationalisation, and will 
discuss some key changes that internationalisation has brought to diplomacy. 
I then proceed to ask whether there are ways in which the changes in diplo-
macy that characterised internationalisation are now being further intensi-
fied, whether there are new factors afoot, and whether we are looking at 
changes that will cumulate in a major change in diplomatic practices on the 
whole. First, let us look at globalisation. 
SPACE 
If diplomacy is defined broadly enough – say, as the mediated exchange be-
tween polities – then globalisation does not necessarily emerge as a vital 
challenge to modern-day diplomats, and any changes that it brings to diplo-
macy appear inconsequential to its practice. The literature provides an early 
example of this approach in the work of Adam Watson, ([1982] 1984), who 
was primarily interested in changes in international systems as they have 
unfolded over the last five thousand years. When confronted with a new is-
sue area such as human rights, he rested content with the assertion that time-
honoured practices would take care of it. 
If, however, we define diplomacy as the written exchange of documents 
between states, where ‘state’ is understood as the kind of centralised, hierar-
chical and bounded polity that has emerged in Europe and then spread across 
the globe over the past five centuries or so, then globalisation becomes a key 
challenge to the practice of diplomacy. The reason is spatial organisation. 
The state is a polity based on a particular territorial mode of organisation. 
Weber saw it as a claimed monopoly on the use of physical force. Schum-
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peter saw it as a claimed monopoly on taxation. Durkheim saw it as a nexus 
of domination between a power elite and a spatially bounded society. In any 
case, we are talking about a spatial area that at any given time remains the 
same, and that is clearly delineated for all involved. The delineations may 
vary over time and they may at any given time be contested, but the principle 
of delineation remains essential. Globalisation inherently involves de-
territorialisation: hence, it is an ipso facto challenge to the state. 
Indeed, it may be argued that we have been here before. For example, 
during the Middle Ages, spatial organisation was fluid. Not all polities were 
bounded, and different polities faced different challenges. This made for a 
plethora of diplomatic practices. Take the 1240s. Certain realms were fairly 
centralised, particularly in the north of what had at times been referred to as 
‘Europe’ some four hundred years before and would be known by that 
moniker again within some two hundred years. The people who were sent on 
embassies, however, were not specifically trained to deal with foreign kings. 
They were the same individuals that the monarch used for dealing with his 
nobles. There was no such thing as foreign policy personnel whatsoever, for 
the simple reason that there was no division between ‘foreign’ and ‘domes-
tic’ policy (Neumann, forthcoming). The same went for papal missi: these 
messengers were used for dealing with persons of power, regardless of 
where they fit into the spatial organisation (Der Derian, 1987). We have a 
survival of this practice in the etymology of the term ‘exequatur’ for the 
agreement of a polity’s head to allow someone to serve as a consul to an-
other polity. Furthermore, even if the missi were seemingly specialists in 
diplomacy, there was no guarantee that they would head diplomatic mis-
sions. For example, of the three missions sent by Pope Innocent IV to meet 
the invading Mongols at this time, none seems to have been manned by missi 
(Ruotsala, 2001). Furthermore, that diplomats often hailed from the same 
polity as the one they represented was largely due to convenience. This look 
at diplomacy in the 1240s demonstrates that de-territorialised politics is not 
anything new, and that diplomatic functions can reflect this kind of spatial 
organisation. 
TIME AND DENSITY 
Simply because the de-territorialisation of politics is nothing new does not 
mean that globalisation is not a new challenge for diplomats. In fact, global-
isation entails two more crucial factors in addition to space. The first of these 
is time. The speed with which information and, to a slightly lesser degree, 
material objects can travel is rapidly increasing. Again, it may be argued that 
the challenges posed to diplomacy by this shrinking of response time are not 
new. For example, if one compares the response of diplomacy to the advent 
of cable-based telegraphy from the 1860s onwards and the advent of the 
internet over a century later, there are obvious parallels to be drawn. In both 
cases, the changes were driven by the military and by merchants, and re-
sisted by diplomats, who were reluctant to use this technology when it was 
introduced – although it soon became an indispensable tool for diplomats 
(Nickles, 2003). In both cases, the reasons for the reluctance can be attrib-
uted to a fear of compromising secret information and of admitting under-
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lings into the heart of the organisation. This pattern may be found, to a lesser 
degree, where all new technology is concerned (for an additional example, 
consider the telephone). Historically, diplomats seem to be particularly petri-
fied by social change, but eventually they, like everybody else, are forced to 
respond. In the case of space, the changes have to do with the recurrence of a 
pattern; where time is concerned, the changes have more to do with the in-
tensification of a pattern. 
The second factor, density (in the sense introduced by John Ruggie), is 
also associated with intensification. The density of flows of everything – 
from persons (tourism, migration) to information (TV programmes, internet 
home pages) to goods – is higher than ever. For diplomacy, one obvious 
consequence is that consular work has exploded and the potential tasks are 
literally infinite. True, in the late 19th century the flow of goods was intense 
and increasing rapidly, but the absolute number of people involved was 
much less than what it is today. Furthermore, the total global population was 
significantly lower (something in the order of one in every ten human beings 
who has ever lived has done so in the post-Second World War period), so in 
absolute terms the flows of persons and goods today are absolutely unprece-
dented. This density has effects that are not only quantitative but also quali-
tative, for it challenges the very ‘boundedness’ of the state. A polity may be 
called ‘bounded’ only between that polity and other polities there exists a set 
of boundaries important in a sufficient number of contexts. Thus, there is a 
threshold for how large the flows of information and material objects may be 
perceived to be, before the polity is no longer thought of as bounded. Once 
the density of communication exceeds this threshold, the polity is no longer 
clearly territorialised.  
The flow of immigrants into the USA is substantial, as is the flow of in-
formation and material objects in and out of that country. The US govern-
ment has reacted by thinking about territorialisation in a new way. For ex-
ample, it is taxing certain goods and services at the source and insisting on 
US jurisdiction over companies that are noted on US stock exchanges, re-
gardless of their physical location. The government is also imposing a cer-
tain number of de-territorialised practices, such as e-mail surveillance. None-
theless, the USA can hardly be called a de-territorialised state. But the 
changes are of such a magnitude and are increasing at such a pace that we 
may easily imagine a situation in which the ‘density threshold’ is perceived 
to be surpassed.1 
In sum, the de-territorialisation of politics which is at the heart of global-
isation is nothing new. However, the degree to which time and density have 
intensified is indeed new, as is the combination of these three factors.  
 
                                                     
Acknowledgements. I should like to thank the participants at the Centre for International 
Governance Innovation at Wilton Park, 23–25 June 2006, for comments, and Eva Fet-
scher for research assistance. 
1 Indeed, one way of interpreting the diplomacy of the Bush era is as an overall attempt to 
salvage the principle of territoriality in an era of globalisation: homogenisation of space 
by means of direct investment, etc., in NAFTA and Europe (‘the democratic peace’); at-
tempts to make the rest of the world more compatible with the US model in most other 
places; use of force where this strategy is seen to have scant prospects (‘rogue states’ like 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran); and attacks on the idea of multilateral diplomacy and the institu-
tions within which it is practised. 
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INTERNATIONALISATION 
As noted, the world has seen intensification in time and density before, in the 
process that began to accelerate somewhere around the Seven Years’ War 
(1756–63) and that gathered momentum around the time of the First World 
War. Let us call it internationalisation, and see it as a phenomenon that fore-
shadows globalisation. Then, too, the key changes had to do with intensifica-
tions of time and density. New technologies played a key role (the telegraph, 
the cable/wire, the telephone), and there was a considerable time-lag before 
diplomats were forced to implement changes that were already well under 
way elsewhere in the political world. Internationalisation eventually brought 
about key changes – including mounting pressure for accountability, and a 
broadening of recruitment patterns and multilateral diplomacy. It is instruc-
tive to consider briefly how diplomacy was changed by these developments, 
because it can indicate ways in which diplomacy is being challenged by 
globalisation as well.  
Where accountability is concerned, diplomacy left its relations to parlia-
ment largely to the top politicians, and thickened its interface to the press 
and the media. Here we are talking about a build-up of outer bulwarks in the 
organisation, typically called Press and Information Departments, that were 
low in internal prestige and whose job it was to serve or forestall journalists.2 
The broadening of recruitment patterns started with a change from the ar-
istocracy to the bourgeoisie (mainly at the end of the 19th century). It contin-
ued with women (especially around the Second World War), and went on to 
encompass new social groups (so far, largely in Western countries). The 
overall trend here has been the same as in the case of technology: diplomats 
lag behind soldiers and merchants, but before very long they mimic the 
changes that have taken place in these spheres. 
Fairly quickly, the new institutional form of permanent multilateral di-
plomacy that was to be found in the League of Nations went from being the 
preserve of politicians to that of diplomats. Furthermore, it fell to foreign 
ministries to staff the offices of the League – which they generally did by 
drawing on people from their own ranks, including the diplomatic services. 
As the number of international organisation (IO) employees increased, fewer 
entered directly from the diplomatic services, but recruitment remained 
largely the preserve of the world’s foreign ministries. We are talking about 
delegation of key functions under the guidance of a foreign ministry-based 
cadre here (Weiss, 1975).  
It has been observed that some of the key changes expected to flow from 
internationalisation did not happen. First and foremost there was the pre-
dicted fall of permanent representations. Referring precisely to the ever-
increasing density of international and transnational relations, analysts like 
George Modelski predicted the demise of the state’s permanent representa-
tion. With tongue in cheek, Modelski suggested that the whole institution be 
substituted by a ship afloat on some world ocean, with one ambassadorial 
cabin per state, where the ambassadors could conveniently exchange calls 
and dine with each another.  
                                                     
2   Instructively, in several foreign ministries the key press spokesperson is not even attached 
to this department, but is rather to be found in the secretariat. 
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In fact, Modelski’s comment was not much more than an elegant way of 
pointing out that the ambassadorial function of representation had become 
less important. Even between pairs of states where contact density has been 
extremely high for decades (as in Scandinavia) or in countries engaged in an 
advanced state of supranational integration (like the Original Six of today’s 
EU), the resident ambassador holds sway. Internationalisation has brought 
new practices to diplomacy – but, much like new technologies, instead of 
supplanting the older ones, they have attached themselves nicely to their 
number. 
MORE OF THE SAME 
With globalisation, there has been a further increase where the pressure for 
accountability and the broadening of recruitment patterns and multilateral 
diplomacy are concerned. 
The pressure for accountability has not first and foremost taken the form 
of further calls for parliamentarian control, although there is patchy move-
ment in this direction. The key change seems to concern relations with the 
media. More than half a century ago, Marshall McLuhan (1962: 41) pointed 
out that compression in time and space had put the speed of information at a 
premium and changed our ways of understanding the world: ‘[When…] a 
new technology extends one or more of our senses outside us into the social 
world, then new ratios among all of our senses will occur in that particular 
culture. It is comparable to what happens when a new note is added to a 
melody.’  
It is journalists who are the principal composers of globalisation. Gone 
are the days when members of the press respectfully approached diplomats 
in the hope of picking up some treasured comment.3 Today’s journalists and 
diplomats are mutually dependent on one another. Ceteris paribus, it is the 
journalists that set the pace by breaking the news, and the diplomats who 
react. In the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, morning meetings address the 
question of how to respond to headline news. Furthermore, although the me-
dia regularly decide to carry a story for days in a row, and thereby succeed in 
forcing the Ministry into a defensive posture, the converse is rarely the case. 
We should, of course, not over-generalise this trend. Any foreign ministry 
may still withhold from the media information that it deems to be particu-
larly sensitive, and will continue to do so. During the Thatcher years, the 
British Foreign Office was able to play favourites, and often denied overtly 
critical journalists access to its daily briefings. Still, the trend remains clear 
and ubiquitous: the level of access for journalists that is considered ‘normal’ 
by all parties is rising, and all this is happening in the name of transparency. 
This norm is part and parcel of the state–society model now spreading across 
the globe, and that means that as long as ministries and politicians do not 
take active measures to halt or reverse the trend, it is bound to continue. 
Ever since people like Benjamin Franklin and Tom Paine played a role in 
internationalisation by casting themselves as diplomats of mankind, much 
has been made of the importance of ‘world society’ and ‘world opinion’. 
                                                     
3  See, for example, Dickie (2004). 
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While world opinion is a social fact, what remains unclear is how it should 
be conceptualised. Nor is it evident to what degree world opinion impinges 
on foreign policy outcomes. National public opinions are multifaceted and 
blurry as well, and we have endless examples of how political outcomes may 
run against them – but that does not stop them from acting as very real parts 
of any politician’s equation. For diplomats, who deal in changing peoples’ 
impressions of countries and of events, world opinion is important, and it 
looms larger and larger as space becomes compressed.4  
Globalisation means that the question of information becomes a question 
of proliferating target groups. Whereas the diplomatic function of informa-
tion used to concern gathering information and presenting it to politicians, 
the circle of relevant takers has expanded. Public diplomacy, once the curi-
ous preserve of Soviet diplomats, is primarily targeting domestic media these 
days, but there are other targets as well. More is being spent on entertaining 
foreign journalists. It is not unheard-of for ambassadors to write letters to the 
editor or even appear on TV in their host countries. The Canadian innovation 
of staging town hall meetings has begun to spread. Utilising interactive are-
nas for discussing foreign policy on and off the Internet is increasingly 
common, indeed it is expected. Since Internet discussions can hardly be lim-
ited to citizens, the nature of that medium may further open up space for 
non-citizen voices, thus further blurring the distinction between citizens and 
foreign nationals. Malleable geographical boundaries go together with mal-
leable social boundaries. Briefly, the deepening and broadening of account-
ability experienced by diplomats means that the area of validity for the old 
adage ‘never apologise, never explain’ is diminishing, while the costs of fol-
lowing it are increasing. 
Diplomatic services are also experiencing greater pressure for widening 
their recruitment practices. Since globalisation involves migration, and since 
ethnicity remains a key principle of social organisation around the globe, 
countries that are experiencing widespread immigration are also experienc-
ing pressures for more diplomats with an ethnic minority background. This 
is old hat in immigrant societies like the USA, Israel and, more recently, 
Canada, but it makes for increasing tension in states and diplomatic services 
with a longer history of mainstream-only representtion. The gains to diplo-
matic services of having personnel with diverse linguistic and cultural skills 
are obvious – as are the possible areas of tension involved.  
So far, pressure for more diverse recruitment has concerned citizens. 
Given the nature of globalisation, however, it would not be surprising to see 
a return of the once quite established and non-controversial practice of using 
non-citizens as regular diplomats. After all, this practice survived until well 
into the 18th century and would in several ways signify an historical normali-
sation. We see a special case of this already in the regular exchanges of dip-
lomats between foreign ministries, with French diplomats serving in the Brit-
ish Foreign Office, Hungarian diplomats in the Norwegian MFA, and so on.  
                                                     
4  A relatively recent example, which also illustrates the power of a popular culture genre, is 
how a series of caricatures of the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper spawned 
diplomatic activity in dozens of states. 
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NEW FACTORS 
Novelty is relative. If we ever find ourselves (or land ourselves) in the situa-
tion of having to establish diplomatic first contact with aliens, some re-
searcher is certain to produce a piece on how first contacts between ancient 
cultures may be seen as a predecessor. Every Jesus has his John the Baptist. 
So if it is assumed that the exchange of diplomats between diplomatic ser-
vices is following an established historical pattern, whereas co-opting dip-
lomats from NGOs is not, this distinction is, in the final analysis, an arbitrary 
one. Nonetheless, when, at Robin Cook’s behest, the Foreign Office re-
cruited Amnesty International’s former parliamentary officer to advise on 
human rights, and a member of Save the Children to work on the rights of 
children, he went from soliciting advice to headhunting people. If that is not 
totally new, there is certainly a novelty to his reverse move, which was to 
second people from the Foreign Office’s own human-rights department to 
Article 19 and to the Minority Rights Group (The Economist, 6 March 
1999). These movements of people between the state sector and NGOs add 
to a certain increase in movement among a state’s ministries (Cooper and 
Hocking, 2000).  
There is of course considerable variation among services when it comes 
to the level of diplomatic exclusivity associated with recruitment and train-
ing patterns. In France, state officials are educated en bloc; the best tend to 
choose employment in the Ministry of Finance, whereas the runners-up go to 
the Quai d’Orsay; in the USA, there is an open exam; in Norway, there is 
application followed by a two-tiered exam system. The more closed the sys-
tem, the greater the shock of having to migrate to NGOs. Furthermore, in 
countries (like the USA) that avail themselves of the spoils system for am-
bassadorial posts, the problematique of the closed system is valid only for 
organisational strata up to the ambassadorial level. We may add that diplo-
mats throughout the 20th century often went on leave to work as judges, 
business analysts etc., and later returned to their service; so whatever the 
degree of professionalisation, diplomacy has never been an entirely closed 
system. Nonetheless, it is a fact that the ésprit de corps amongst diplomats 
has been fostered by common training, the feeling of belonging to the chosen 
few, and shared nomadic professional experience. By ‘taking people in from 
the street’, as the saying goes, this principle is put under strain. It is also 
challenged when diplomats are put to work if not on the street, then in 
(other) non-traditional settings. Even if diplomats have always been no-
madic, there is something new about migrating between an MFA and NGOs 
rather than between MFAs and postings abroad, or MFAs and IOs. Changes 
in recruitment patterns mirror changes in other diplomatic practices. The ex-
plosion in multilateral diplomacy is being followed by a broadening in the 
kind of entities between which diplomats mediate. 
Here, we have arrived at a logical consequence of globalisation. If tran-
scending boundaries is the essence of the phenomenon and this means that 
the state system must increasingly be seen as only one part of the global po-
litical system, then it stands to reason that state diplomats must sooner or 
later take cognizance of the other kinds of polities that exist within the sys-
tem. If negotiation and, more widely, mediation is a key diplomatic function, 
then the work of these diplomats increasingly involves mediating not only 
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between the state, but also between it and other polities. Neither is it surpris-
ing that the question of whether these other polities may be called ‘domestic’ 
or ‘foreign’ is not necessarily of the essence. The domestic/foreign distinc-
tion is a correlate of state boundaries. If state boundaries become relativised, 
so too with the domestic/foreign distinction. 
Again, one may argue that this development is nothing new by pointing 
to the already widespread proliferation of state agencies that pursue diplo-
matic practices. Students of diplomacy have covered this well. From the late 
1960s, the ‘comparative foreign policy’ school detailed the challenge that 
other ministries posed to diplomatic services (Hermann et al., 1987; 
Rosenau, 1969). Some twenty years later, a small set of literature on sub-
state diplomacy emerged (Hocking, 1993; Michelmann and Soldatos, 1990; 
Neumann, 2002). Moreover, throughout the European Union, the various 
prime ministers’ offices have played an increasingly important role in the 
shaping of diplomacy.5 But where is the literature on the diplomacy of state–
NGO relations? For example, although states are the standard targets for the 
work of what Keck and Sikkink (1998) refer to as transnational agency net-
works, little has been written about state responses. These responses make 
up a growing part of diplomacy, and should be examined.  
The increasing significance of other kinds of polities is a potential chal-
lenge to the exclusivity of state diplomats. Since every polity needs diplo-
macy, there is an increasing number of groups that look like functional 
equivalents of diplomats. They are sometimes even referred to as diplomats 
– also in the academic literature  (Stopford and Strange, 1991). As yet, this 
seems infelicitous, for the simple reason that the tasks undertaken by these 
people do not generally add up to the tasks of a diplomat. The key functions 
of diplomacy can be said to be three: information gathering, negotiation and 
communication (Wight, 1977: 115–17). Bull (1977: 171–72) adds ‘minimi-
sation of the effects of friction’ and ‘symbolising the existence of the society 
of states’; this can be called smoothing and representation.6 Typically, the 
groups outside the diplomatic services who carry out functions equivalent to 
these do not handle the full gamut of such tasks. For example, any transna-
tional firm of some size will have people working on information gathering 
and communication as well as employing negotiators – but typically, these 
are different individuals. Again, travel agencies will have offices overseas 
representing them, but the people working there will be different from those 
who do the information gathering and negotiation. It would be a mistake to 
maintain that even the most central diplomat encapsulates all five functions 
at the same point in time; nonetheless, so far, state diplomats seem to com-
bine them to a qualitatively higher degree than do representatives of other 
kinds of polities. 
As an example, consider expatriates working for development NGOs. 
This may be the one group of non-diplomats that comes closest to combining 
                                                     
5 The explosion in so-called summit diplomacy may be seen as a case of non-diplomats 
availing themselves of the shrinking of space and time to take matters in their own hands. 
But the individuals involved are by definition top politicians, usually heads of state, and 
they have always had the last word in affairs diplomatic. By rushing things to the top, 
summit diplomacy may serve as shorthand for the kind of possibilities that globalisation 
opens up, but it does not involve a radical reshuffling of diplomacy. See Dunn (1996).  
6  We may expand Bull’s point of symbolising the society of states by postulating that these 
people symbolise global or world society. 
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the traditional functions of diplomats – but they are still a far stretch from 
doing it to the same degree as traditional diplomats. Moreover, foreign min-
istries have thus far been able to control these groups fairly effortlessly. 
Where NGOs are concerned, the pattern is that foreign ministries tend to co-
opt NGOs once they have reached a certain mass, and turn them into quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organisations (QUANGOs). In Norway, for 
example, there are five large NGOs working in the field of development, two 
of which are detachments of transnational outfits (Red Cross, Save the Chil-
dren). All five receive more than 90 per cent of their financial budgets from 
the Norwegian state, as administered by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. 
Diplomats remain in control. So far, there are very few examples of devel-
opmentalists (or ‘well-diggers’, to use diplomatic jargon) scuppering diplo-
mats, but plenty of examples of the reverse. 
There is an outright exception to what has been said, which is that politi-
cian, in the capacity of heads of state and government, foreign ministers and 
the like, have always been the diplomats’ bosses, so this is nothing new. The 
challenge to diplomats is the same as the challenge to the states for which 
they work: to deal with the new polities and personnel of globalisation. If the 
state and the diplomat undergo changes in order to handle this task, it is not a 
foregone conclusion that their relative importance will diminish as a result of 
globalisation. 
The circle of what may be called the diplomat’s ‘relevant others’ – those 
other social groups with which the diplomat has to work – is widening. As 
yet, however, no other group has personnel that come as close to embodying 
the whole range of relevant functions as does the diplomat. An interesting 
trend is the growing use that other actors make of former diplomats (retired 
or otherwise). There is a large literature on the importance of privatisation in 
the realm of security and the role played by companies such as Sandlines and 
Executive Outcomes. Increasingly, transnational corporations and other poli-
ties are using former diplomats – and this needs to be studied. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we may ask which transformations are necessary for state dip-
lomats to maintain their importance. The key challenge springs from the 
very nature of globalisation. Density makes possible new polities, and the 
reconfiguration of space and time increase the viability and reach of these 
new polities within the global political system. As the diplomats’ circle of 
relevant others widens, they are faced with the challenge of mediating more 
types of relations than ever before. The first challenge is to acknowledge this 
transformation. This may sound obvious, but it is important in identity poli-
tics for a group to acknowledge its relevant others, wherein the ‘we-group’ is 
dependent on this acknowledgement. The fact that diplomacy’s circle of 
relevant others is widening does not mean that diplomacy’s circle of recogni-
tion is expanding as well. Diplomats and diplomatic services continue to 
seek recognition primarily from other diplomats and other diplomatic ser-
vices. When diplomats effectively come to understand that they are actually 
dependent on the recognition of other social entities, they will be forced to 
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review and improve upon their traditional methods. Here let me mention 
two: hierarchy and modus operandi. 
Hierarchy is a cherished principle of diplomacy, and in many ways it is 
unavoidable. Clear communication of intent is a key diplomatic task which 
spells coordination, and coordination spells some kind of hierarchy. How-
ever, the stronger the hierarchy, the more cumbersome the chain of com-
mand, and the longer the reaction time. This means that globalisation, which 
compresses time, is a direct challenge to hierarchy. New technologies also 
favour hierarchy – e-mails may be used for commands, and electronic texts 
make it easier for the top of the hierarchy to trim information right up until 
its release. At the same time, these technologies have contributed to the den-
sity of flows that put the hierarchy under attack. We may look to the Danish 
diplomatic service for one type of response – to increase the number of inter-
faces between diplomats and their environment. During the 1990s, the Dan-
ish MFA simply decided that any diplomat should be empowered to answer 
a wide range of questions from outside and take various new initiatives on 
his or her own. This did not change the principle of hierarchy in any way – 
people who are out of line still get slapped down and the insubordinate are 
disciplined, just as they used to be – but the subject matter to which hierar-
chy is applied shrunk dramatically. If an organisation can speak with a thou-
sand voices on many issues on which it used to be able to speak with only 
one, that spells increased action capacity. The network organisation is sim-
ply a far more efficient model for fulfilling the key diplomatic function of 
information collection and dissemination under the conditions created by 
globalisation than is the old megaphone model. It also gives the Danish 
MFA the upper hand over other diplomatic services that still do not trust 
their employees to speak on their behalf on quotidian business, and therefore 
deem it necessary to handle all kinds of queries from the very top.  
A second consequence stemming from the range of polities is a prolifera-
tion of sources of information. The public struggle for defining reality inten-
sifies, and diplomats have certain disadvantages in this respect. Since jour-
nalists specialise in speed while academics have focused on adding social 
and historical context, diplomats will tend to lose out to these relevant oth-
ers, on both breaking news and on analysis. For decades now, diplomatic 
services have sought to compensate for this by co-opting journalists and aca-
demics. Diplomats have nonetheless maintained their modus operandi of 
reacting to others rather than initiating action themselves. The advent of 
globalisation has put this principle under increasing pressure, for with the 
mounting speed of information and density, the advantages of having the 
communicative initiative are forever growing. The Canadian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has experimented with 
changing the modus operandi from being reactive to being pro-active – or, as 
they put it, from being ‘backward leaning’ to being ‘forward leaning’. The 
increase in efficiency in carrying out the function of communication is obvi-
ous. Why have other services not followed suit? One possibility is habit, but 
a more probable reason concerns identity. Under the old rules, it is better to 
be sought after rather than to be the seeker; better to answer than to ask. Be-
ing pro-active means acknowledging to the competition that you are not in-
dispensable.  A prerequisite for pro-activeness is recognition of other social 
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groups as something more than passive takers. Here we have a transforma-
tion that is bound to come, but that is still hampered by a lingering diplo-
matic self-understanding and idea of its place in society that is definitely pre-
globalisation. 
If there is an overall logic to the shift in political rationality under condi-
tions of globalisation, it has to do with a change from direct to indirect rule. 
More is left to individuals, and control is growing more indirect, with direct 
control increasingly reserved for after-the-fact situations when indirect con-
trol has proven too soft to secure the desired result. This logic is working its 
way into diplomacy as well. Consider a move like the Danish one, where the 
function of information is made into everybody’s concern. This depends on 
indirect control being effective. By training its employees well in advance, 
the top of the organisation sees to it that the answers given when the top does 
not listen will be within acceptable parameters. Direct control kicks in when 
this indirect strategy does not work. Then consider pro-activeness. It is about 
orchestrating social situations in advance, in the hope that the outcome will 
be more favourable than it would otherwise have been. By employing indi-
rect means, you can save the use of more direct means for a later point. It is 
all about governing from afar. But if you want to govern from afar, then you 
have to be far-sighted. A plan for the long haul in needed in order to con-
sider different outcomes, to listen to second opinions and to have contin-
gency plans. All this breaks with the established modus operandi of diplo-
macy. In sum, it is not on the level of subject matter or personnel, but rather 
on the level of organising principles that globalisation seems to be having 
the keenest impact on diplomatic practice.  
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